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ABSTRACT
Local government political leaders have a hard job these days. More 
and more they are confronted by citizens demanding transparency and 
a say in the production of social goods. Challenging the hegemony of 
local government, they connect their resources to come up with grass 
roots solutions. Fear of litigation claims and an increase in the complexity 
of policymaking and administration and fiscal scarcity render local 
administrations risk averse.
How to effectively structure the frontline between local government 
and local communities? Open and collaborative governance approaches 
hold the promise of developing to mediate these tensions, but what 
are the implications for the way local democracy, local government and 
local administration work? This article looks at the ugly face of trust in 
collaborative and open governance on the basis of a comparative case-
study from Apeldoorn (The Netherlands). The article identifies and 
analyses patterns of (a lack of) open governance and offers alternative 
models to the organization of the frontline between local government 
and society.
Keywords: urban governance, open government, political-administrative relations, 
civic participation
JEL: D73
1 Urban Governance and Transparency
Concepts like “transparency” and “openness” loom large in local governance 
these days. As the traditional approach to local government has given way 
to local governance as a heterogeneous approach which focuses on public-
private-social partnership in affecting and governing the local community’s 
life instead of the execution of local government tasks, it is no longer clear 
where local governance starts and ends. The same could be said for defining 
concepts like “mandate” and “authority”. As ever fewer people turn up at 
local elections and local councillors have to govern a myriad of private-public 
ventures that are only partially under their control, transparency withers.
DOI: 10.17573/ipar.2015.3-4.07 1.02 Review article
162 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 3–4/2015
Frans Jorna
Local governments across Europe experiment with ways to increase 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness. There are indications, 
however, that these efforts to enhance the “openness of government” 
confuse and obstruct traditional mechanisms of democratic control (Meijer 
& Bolívar, 2015). This article examines the impact of open government by 
means of increased transparency on traditional local democratic practices in 
the Dutch city of Apeldoorn, known as a frontrunner in engaging citizens in 
the governance of their city. More precisely, it maps the effects of efforts 
to increase transparency through new engagement oriented modes of urban 
governance on traditional democratic practices.
The question addressed in this article is:
How do changes promoting open and collaborative governance in 
state-society and public-private interactions affect formal local decision-
making?
The interface between local government and urban society is often messy. 
From a formal representative democratic point of view, citizen engagement 
not only holds promises, but also contains threats to local democracy such 
as co-optation of local government but (a cooperative of) private interests; 
contestation in the form of increased negative social action against 
collective decisions on the basis of not-in-my-back-yard motives; skewing 
the representation of interests, favouring the politically and bureaucratic 
competent citizens over citizens that do not have a clue of how government 
works or do not have the resources to try and influence; or the dominance of 
here-and-now concerns and interests over longer term “weaker” interest and 
social goals.
In paragraph 2 the literature on urban governance and openness is reviewed. 
This review culminates in the formulation of four hypotheses in paragraph 3. 
Paragraph 4 describes the research methodology applied to track and trace 
the (unintended) impact of increased transparency on local government. 
Paragraph 5 provides an overview of the way the city of Apeldoorn has 
sought to structure its boundary with society so as to increase the openness 
of local government to its citizens. Paragraph 6 introduces the three cases 
that were selected in terms of context, content, time, domain and players, as 
briefly as possible1. In paragraph 7, we analyse the mechanisms that operated 
in these cases and the ways in open government can lead to unintended 
consequences, the factors at play, the strategies that local governors apply 
to prevent and combat negative or unintended consequences. Paragraph 8 
analyses the mechanisms by means of applying the hypotheses. In paragraph 
9, we discuss the findings, provide an answer to the research question and 
1 This article is the product of cooperation between the City of Apeldoorn and Chair of 
Governance of Saxion University that carries a research program into Open Government. In 
close collaboration, three cases of open government and unintended consequences were 
selected and analysed.
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discuss the relevance of this article for the field of open urban governance 
and the concept of transparency.
2 Openness and Urban Governance: Theoretical Approaches
Urban governance in this day and age is contested and complex. The sheer 
number of people dwelling in cities, their mobility, their heterogeneity, 
the speed of social and technological development and the increased 
interdependence between the cities and the rest of the world impair their 
governability (Van Gunsteren, 2006). The “urban citizen” is a powerful, 
unpredictable (Beck, 1992), well informed effective organizer capable of 
garnering support for social action without the help of big institutions such 
as government. 
Traditional representative democracy in cities is confronted with a number 
of challenges. As to representation, it is less and less clear who is being 
represented and who wishes to be represented in formal assemblies. As the 
voter turnout decreases, how does democracy ensure the legitimacy of local 
councils and councillors? The resilience of cities, their capacity to deal with 
the unknown, is impaired by the growing complexity of urban administration. 
The number of tasks of local governments, the size of municipal budgets and 
their importance for citizens as “first governments” has increased strongly, 
but so has the dependence of local governments on central government, the 
complexity of programs and the need to rely on concerted action with other 
local and regional actors, greatly increasing the risks local governments run. 
As the heterogeneity of urban population increases, the local social contract 
becomes strained and solidarity wanes. Contestation of political decisions, by 
social action, political campaigns or legal procedures impair the capability of 
local governments to affect the status quo while simultaneously increasing 
the conflicts of interest between its inhabitants. The rift between young 
and old, rich and poor, newcomers and “aboriginals” grows. The ability of 
local inhabitants to effectively organize themselves limits the ability of local 
government to enforce political decision and general rules.
For city councillors, these trends lead to questions about the validity of their 
work and mandate. The job at hand is more time-consuming than ever, but 
public opinion is against them. In the past decades, the length of the terms 
councillors serve has decreased, while the number of councillors leaving 
midterm elections has increased. The information that they have to their 
availability to take decisions has multiplied dramatically, as has the impact 
of municipal decisions on the lives of its inhabitants, but the expertise that 
councillors can call upon is still organized in the same way it was in the 19th 
century. Essentially, urban governance is governance by amateurs, in a day and 
age where knowledge is dispersed and society is much more knowledgeable 
than it used to be. The number of formal grievances, complaints, law 
suits etcetera increases, while the readiness and ability of urban citizens 
164 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 3–4/2015
Frans Jorna
to participate in formal democracy has dwindled. Efforts at democratic 
innovation such as plebiscites, referenda, neighbourhood councils and 
interactive policymaking appear futile, hardly attract interest, and the ones 
that are interested are the usual suspects that already participate in formal 
ways.
Apparently, cities can no longer be ruled from above. In an effort to 
reinforce legitimacy and effectiveness, cities around the globe have added 
elements of participation to their repertoire by increasing transparency 
of data (Townsend, 2013). Involving citizens in the maintenance of their 
neighbourhood, budgeting procedures and public procurement, they seek to 
engage society in the fabric of governance fabric. This article contends that 
this shift is more than an addition and elaboration of our existing government 
paradigms (Goldstein, 2013). It suggests that a true democratic turn is at hand, 
transforming local governance, partly destroying it as well. Post-bureaucratic 
government has been replaced by “open government” and “do it yourself 
democratic” practices built on three approaches to enhance transparency:
• Open data2, even in domains hitherto dominated by hybrid contracting 
and procurement procedures (e.g. public transport; energy, water and 
sanitation);
• Open procedures and freedom of information, such as open spending, 
crowd-sourcing policy, participatory evaluation and participatory 
budgeting;
• Government participation in social self-governance of social services 
and regulation instead of public engagement in local government 
providing public goods, in the form of social cooperatives, face-to-face 
citizen assemblies and other citizen communes.
Citizen engagement is not an either/or issue. Five forms of engagement are 
distinguished3 (Table1).
2 Following the definition in the Open Government Charter (http://www.opengovdata.org/
home/8principles), open data: Data Must Be Complete. All public data are made available. 
Data are electronically stored information or recordings, including but not limited to 
documents, databases, transcripts, and audio/visual recordings. Public data are data that are 
not subject to valid privacy, security or privilege limitations, as governed by other statutes. 
Data Must Be Primary. Data are published as collected at the source, with the finest possible 
level of granularity, not in aggregate or modified forms. Data Must Be Timely. Data are made 
available as quickly as necessary to preserve the value of the data. Data Must Be Accessible. 
Data are available to the widest range of users for the widest range of purposes. Data Must 
Be Machine processable. Data are reasonably structured to allow automated processing of 
it. Access Must Be Non-Discriminatory. Data are available to anyone, with no requirement 
of registration. Data Formats Must Be Non-Proprietary. Data are available in a format over 
which no entity has exclusive control. Data Must Be License-free. Data are not subject to any 
copyright, patent, trademark or trade secret regulation. Reasonable privacy, security and 
privilege restrictions may be allowed as governed by other statutes. Finally, compliance must 
be reviewable. A contact person must be designated to respond to people trying to use the 
data. A contact person must be designated to respond to complaints about violations of the 
principles. An administrative or judicial court must have the jurisdiction to review whether the 
agency has applied these principles appropriately.
3 Retrieved from http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/imported/
IAP2%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf
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Table 1:  Five forms of citizens engagement
Inform Consult Involve Collaborate Empower
To provide 
the public 
with objective 
and balanced 
information to 
assist them in 
understanding, 
the problem, 
alternatives, 
opportunities 
and/or solutions.
To obtain 
public feedback 
on analysis, 
alternatives and/or 
decisions.
To work directly 
with the public 
throughout 
the process 
to ensure that 
public concerns 
and aspirations 
are consistently 
understood and 
considered.
To partner with 
the public in each 
aspect of the 
decision including 
the development 
of alternatives and 
the identification 
of the preferred 
solution.
To place final 
decision making in 
the hands of the 
public.
Source: http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iap2.org/resource/resmgr/imported/
IAP2%20Spectrum_vertical.pdf
The literature on public participation offers us one more conceptual tool in 
analyzing participation strategies. There are two different ways in which local 
governments organize transparency (Newman, Barnes, Sullivan, & Knops, 
2004): “targeted transparency” and “embedded transparency”. Targeted 
transparency represents a distinctive category of public policies that, at 
their most basic level, mandate disclosure by corporations or other actors of 
standardized, comparable, and disaggregated information regarding specific 
products or practices to a broad audience in order to achieve a specific 
public policy purpose. Thus, targeted transparency does not require specific 
technologies, performance targets, or taxes. Instead, it relies on thousands 
of individual choices by information disclosers and users who interact to 
establish acceptable risk levels or improve organizational performance. 
Embedded transparency, in contrast, builds on already existing processes; 
does not create new institutions, but builds on existing ones; and builds on 
the engagement of existing stakeholders.
3 Hypotheses
This article looks at what happens on the boundary between local government 
(city) and society (citizens). This boundary has been constitutive of public 
administration. It is designated with two distinctions: state-society and public-
private.
The state-society distinction is the core nucleus of modern Western 
thinking about government. Max Weber (2014) wrote much of his work on 
the interrelation between the two, and even nowadays the distinction still 
prevails in most discussions of public administration. The state – read local 
government – functions as a social contract between free citizens, giving up 
their full autonomy, receiving equality before the law, due process, habeas 
corpus and other safeguards in return. Society provides crucial elements of 
support for a state to be effective, and the state is critical to collective action 
in society (Sellers, 2010).
There is one other crucial distinction to be discussed: the public-private 
distinction. This is one is less clear than the state-society distinction 
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and covers at least two different conceptualisations: 1) political vs. social 
(read: the absence of the state, representation, generalisation; instead, 
direct interaction between private interests); and 2) social versus personal, 
read: collectivist versus individualist approaches. In terms of governance, the 
confusion is much less troubling: we have private law versus administrative 
law etcetera (Weintraub & Kumar, 1997).
The frontline between ordinary citizens and their government, and the whole 
process of giving/receiving mandates and organizing accountability, can thus 
be conceptualized in four ways (Figure 1).
Figure 1:  The public-social frontline
p
ub
lic
state
p
ri
va
teParticipation Rule of law
Social goods/rights Representation
society
Both distinctions are about balancing interests: the individual versus the 
collective; the individual versus the state; inhabitants versus citizens; and 
elected versus non-elected. Basically, democracy functions as a control 
mechanism: it is to ensure the balance of powers and safeguard our “own 
interest” (in whichever way conceptualized), lest things might run out of hand.
Based on this framework, we test four hypotheses:
• Participation: Organized representation is essentially elitist. It favours 
bureaucratic competence.
• Rule of law: Including current stakeholders rigs fair and impartial 
political procedure.
• Social goods and social rights: Tough political decisions that require 
objectivity and yes-in-my-back yard are overly simplified to cater for 
populism.
• Representation: By including private stakeholders focused on their 
short term interest, long term horizons, weaker interest and long term 
social contracts on solidarity between generations and haves/havenots 
are excluded, burdening future developments with todays trade-offs.
Let us briefly describe the pedigree of each hypothesis. The elitist argument 
is rooted in the political science literature on pluralism. Lobbying essentially 
puts a bonus on the ability of highly educated well-off elites to influence 
decision making (Lindblom, 1993). Although Stoker (2010) contends that 
in modern day politics political elites seek a direct power base among the 
electorate because elites are no longer able to control “their” clientele and 
media power has admittedly changed the electoral landscape, political elites 
are still essentially oriented on maintaining the status quo, read: the stakes 
of current elites (Farrell & Drezner, 2008). Representative politics is still 
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structured unequally despite the growing influence of the media and other 
trends (Marsh, Richards, & Smith, 2003).
The hypothesis on fairness of procedure takes the impossibility of state 
objectiveness as point of departure. The state (read: local governments) 
favours and defends the status quo and the interests associated with 
them. It has a vested interest in (for instance) the land acquired for urban 
development; the expertise acquired in civil society organisations that 
have been implementing and administering urban programs in the social 
domain for decades; the use of new infrastructure developed with large 
sums of money. Local governments are therefore prone to rig objective and 
transparent procedure for interest and information that reinforce their past 
positions and decisions.
The hypothesis on over-simplification and lack of objectivity is related to 
this partiality. Local government cannot be objective, and more so in this 
day and age, where political questions are so complex and positions and 
information on them abounds. Any point of view can be backed by figures and 
argumentations, and the clearer these can get communicated in sound bites, 
the better. Then and therefore, Ockham’s razor in the political domain applies: 
the simpler answers are the better, even if this amounts to oversimplification.
The hypothesis on underrepresentation of future or outside voters is a 
corollary of those first three hypotheses. If vested interests can be defended 
much more easily than complex policy options favouring interests not yet 
powerful enough to be heard, they will quietly be ignored and organized out 
of the process.
4 Research Design
To study the mechanisms on the interface between city government and 
society, the process of case selection that we conducted with representatives 
of the city of Apeldoorn was focused on “worst cases”: incidences of city-
citizens interaction where reportedly all actors involved reported imbalances 
and imperfections in the way in which the two systems related. To allow for a 
comparative analysis, only cases from the last council period (2010–2014) were 
selected. One second criterion was the publication of the Councils Report on 
its own functioning leading up to the political crisis on urban development 
land acquisition. Furthermore, we looked for a spread over the different 
domains of urban policy4 to ensure representativeness. One final criterion 
was the “freshness” of the cases: to allow for a reliable reconstruction, no 
evaluation involving the main actors had yet been carried out.
The selection process was conducted by representatives of the city 
management team and the secretariat of the council. It resulted in the 
identification of three cases: the establishment of an emergency winter 
4 Social policy, urban development, infrastructural planning
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shelter in the ‘De Maten’ neighbourhood in 2011; an urban development 
project in the village ‘Loenen’; and the development of a new infrastructural 
grid for the future ‘Zuidbroek’ neighbourhood.
For each of these three cases, an appreciative inquiry group interview 
was organized with representatives of all participants around the table: 
councillors, executive council members, civil servants of diverse categories, 
representatives from neighbourhood or village councils, representatives of 
non-governmental organizations involved and private citizens/entrepreneurs. 
The secretariat of the council in cooperation with city councillors were asked 
to provide an actor analysis and identify the people involved. These were then 
invited by the city of Apeldoorn to participate. Only two actors refused to 
take part in the group interview, instead requesting an individual interview, 
which was granted.
In each of the appreciative inquiry interviews, the participants were asked 
to provide a chronological account of the way grass-roots initiatives had 
originated, the way these initiatives had been developed in cooperation with 
city hall, the rounds of administrative (civil servant) advice, decision-making 
in the executive council, the framing of council proposal and finally decision-
making in the city council itself. The interviews were based on a desk research 
set of 1) formal documents describing the decision-making process 2) a media 
analysis. The interview reports were focused on the mechanisms, not on acts 
of individual actors. As to these mechanisms, in each description, we focused 
on five aspects (Krenjova & Reinsalu, 2013):
Rules of the game: Who determines the rules of the game?
Participation: Which participation mechanisms are used?
Deliberation: What is being deliberated? 
How do participants cooperate, communicate 
and make decisions? 
Empowerment: What role does civil society play?
Control and monitoring: Who checks the implementation?
The mechanisms identified were validated in two sessions with representatives 
of the urban management team, the secretariat of the council and civil 
servant involved. The analysis presented in this article was developed on the 
basis of these sessions. We proceed to describe the state-society frontier in 
Apeldoorn and then describe the three cases.
5 City-Citizens Frontier in Apeldoorn (NL)
The city of Apeldoorn is located in the centre of the Netherlands at some 
60kms east from the Dutch city hub comprising Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The 
Hague and Utrecht. According to Dutch standards, it is a rather green city that 
in the boom of 1970s and 1980s as a New Town quickly grew to some 150.000 
inhabitants, largely through the concentration of first manufacturing firms 
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and then insurance companies and central government public service agencies 
as part of a Dutch national policy to deconcentrate public services over the 
country and have all regions profit from public employment5. Consequently, 
in comparative terms, Apeldoorn is relatively homogenous and stable, with 
a rather big cohort of middle-aged inhabitants. Apeldoorn’s population is 
according to Dutch standards rather well off in terms of household income 
and living standards. It is one of the larger municipalities of Netherlands in 
terms of territory. Lying on the frontier of the largest Dutch National Park 
Hoge Veluwe, it covers an area of 350 km2 and consists of nine villages and 
ten hamlets.
Because of its size, composition and history of rapid growth as a New Town, 
Apeldoorn has a political history of hands-on, project-oriented government 
and direct connections between city hall and the neighbourhoods and 
hamlets. The ties and links between city hall and the city are traditionally 
strong and intense, the style of urban governance collaborative. Social 
partners, companies and entrepreneurs constitute crucial partners in urban 
development, management and policing. The city government has a long 
tradition of neighbourhood oriented policymaking: (participative) district 
budgeting, neighbourhood development plans, neighbourhood based 
management of the public space6.
Owing to this executive style of “getting it done” the ratio of civil servants 
per 1.000 inhabitants in Apeldoorn is relatively small7. Large parts of policy 
administration and implementation are executed by non-governmental 
organisations and other related parties, with limited direct political control 
by the city council. The lack of formal direct political control is compensated 
through recruitment mechanisms. In line with the New Town history of 
Apeldoorn, most of the non-governmental organisations are staffed and led 
by people coming from the same mixed political-cultural elite8.
This stability in terms of governance tradition is mirrored in a politically stable 
council. Apeldoorn has experienced a prolonged period of one ruling coalition 
dominated by two centre/centre-right parties (Christian Democrats/Liberal 
Conservatives). Administrative leadership was provided by external powerful 
mayors. They served long terms and could easily dominate local politics. In 
terms of accountability, the city council only to a limited degree exercised 
political control on the way the city was governed9. Executive councillors 
5 Retrieved from: http://www.apeldoorn.nl/ter/politiekenorganisatie/Plannen-en-projecten/
Plannen-en-projecten-Structuurvisie-Apeldoorn-biedt-ruimte.html
6 For more on Apeldoorns City District Approach: http://www.apeldoorn.nl/DATA/TER/docs/
politiek/dorps_wijkraden/stadsdeelaanpak%20kadernotitie.pdf;
And for area oriented policy development: http://www.svgw.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/Voordracht-politieke-markt-Apeldoorn-23-juni.pdf
7 See http://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/achtergrond/achtergrond/
grote-stad-dik-in-de-ambtenaren.100094.lynkx
8 On the basis of Joint Intermunicipal regulations, with distanced (tiered) political control.
9 Raadsenquête (Council Inquest), rapport Dualisme & Controle in Apeldoorn 2.0 (report 
Dualism & Control in Apeldoorn 2.0).
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and the mayor dealt directly with local (social) entrepreneurs on the basis of a 
very wide and not explicit mandate.
The frontline between city government and citizens is formally structured as 
shown in Table 2.
Table 2:  Structure of the frontline between city government and citizens
C
it
y 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
council members: legislation, policymaking, budgeting, accountability 
processes
municipal executive board members: administration, policy initiation, political 
contacting (city district executive councillor for daily administration affairs)
civil servants: project managers (policy-development; project administration; 
urban development projects)
- case-managers (administration in the domain of welfare; administration of 
national regulation)
- operators (e.g. road maintenance, management public facilities; welfare 
workers)
- neighbourhood managers (stimulating and facilitating social initiatives; 
communicating municipal policies; developing neighbourhood plans)
So
ci
et
y
civil society organizations (CSOs): policy administration (in commission, often 
by foundations)
initiators of private (citizens, companies), social (associations) and 
public (foundations) initiatives (both natural and economic legal entities 
(companies)
general public: elections for office, consultation, formal complaints and legal 
actions
On this frontier, we mapped each of the three cases. Before presenting the 
analysis, we first briefly introduce each of the cases.
6 Cases
6.1 De Maten
In ‘De Maten’ city district, at the early and cold start of the winter of 2011/2012, 
local inhabitants were suddenly confronted with a winter shelter in an old 
scouting centre in the neighbourhood park. It had long been abandoned 
and was deemed unfit for lodging people 24/7. Nonetheless, the shelter 
had opened. A local church had taken initiative to provide winter shelter for 
homeless families roaming the streets of Apeldoorn. Most of these families 
refused to turn to the official shelters driven by a CSO welfare organisation 
that was fully financed by the city, wishing to stay in a drugs free and safe 
environment which the “official shelters” were perceived not to offer. The 
church community (three churches and a foundation) had requested the 
executive councillor in October to indicate a location, but he was weary, being 
advised by his experts that the official welfare organisation already provided 
a covering safety net for the homeless. He conceded however that, if they 
were to find a proper location, he would try his best to accommodate them. 
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Subsequently, each location they came up with was turned down by local civil 
servants invoking official regulations, hazards or risks.
Two months later, winter set in. The church contacted local councillors and 
told them of their frustration not be able to start the shelter because the 
city administration refused to proactively cooperate. These councillors in turn 
contacted the executive councillor and within two days a location had been 
found. In a haste, without the proper permits, without informing the police, 
the official welfare organisation organizing shelter care and neighbouring 
inhabitants through the regular neighbourhood platform, the shelter was 
opened. In the neighbourhood, emotions ran high and stories of possible and 
actual risks circulated quickly.
After the initial start, passions quickly ceded. The shelter served only 26 
homeless people. With 44 volunteers involved and 23.000 euros being spent, 
the church community tried to keep the shelter up and running by reportedly 
sending out cars to pick up people at other parts of the city and transport 
them to ‘De Maten’. Afterwards, the official CSO complained of the high 
cost (marginal as well as per capita) of this voluntary shelter, offering to do it 
themselves next year, in a professional way with less cost.
6.2 Loenen: Urban Development
In the Apeldoorn village of ‘Loenen’, a private building company from within 
the village sought to redevelop a part of the village including commercial 
real estate into a residential area. A local developer had bought some of the 
houses to build a small new neighbourhood. The Apeldoorn Development 
Plan only allowed for some 40 houses to be built in Loenen in the upcoming 
ten years. Stretching the economic viability, the plan contained 40 houses and 
apartments.
Preparations started as early as 2004. For the plan, the real estate developer 
sought the cooperation with one of Apeldoorn’s social housing corporations. 
In an effort to scale down the project to more village-like residential project, 
the municipality formulated a set of demands in terms of spatial quality that 
should be met for the city to be able to go along. As these demands could 
not be met within the original plan, the local developer started to try and 
acquire adjacent plots and premises. The local village committee was weary 
of the ‘urban’ feel that the realisation of this project would give to Loenen, 
but at the same time perceived the project as the only viable option for the 
village to build at all in the upcoming ten years. As time wore on, the project 
halted to a full standstill. New figures on the soundscape effect of the project 
led to new municipal requirements in terms of sound-isolation. Immediate 
neighbours tried to fight against the development, and with success. The 
housing cooperation, seeing how slowly the project developed, reduced its 
participation. This in effect meant that the big launching customer decreased 
its share, thereby negatively affecting the businesscase.
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Meanwhile, so much time and money had been invested in the project, both 
by the investor (money) and city government (time), and other projects stalled 
in order for this project to pass, that opposition from both the inhabitants and 
the public servants dissipated. From 2006–2007 on, all of the public servants 
advising on aspects of the plan one after the other, after voicing opposition, 
approved the plan. In May 2011, five years after the start, the plan reached 
the city council, to be rubberstamped. In comparison to what the project 
developer and the city representatives had set out to achieve, however, but 
without staunch support from the executive or clear expert advice supporting 
the project. The council looked at the proposal with fresh eyes, found a lack 
of clear professional (local public servants) and political (executive councillor) 
support and voted the plan off the table because no-one really seemed to 
“want” the plan.
At the point, the village representatives exploded: this had been the only 
chance at getting new houses for Loenen! Cancelling the project would 
probably mean the end of the building company and results in years of slums 
in Loenen. In an effort to repair the damage, a number of city councillors went 
to visit the village community and explain why they had voted as they had. 
Seeing what had happened, they realized that something had to be done. 
The plan was revived, slightly changed, brought back to the table and was 
adopted. But the tide had turned. In the midst of an economic crisis, it proved 
to be hard to develop a new residential area. In spite of a subvention from 
the regional government to start and build this project as pipeline anticyclic 
investment, the project still remains to be started. The village committee has 
a hotline now with the councillors involved, but the project is still in sketches.
6.3 Zuidbroek: Infrastructure
‘Zuidbroek’ is the last new city district of Apeldoorn under construction 
since 2003. To achieve a favourable mix of populations between Zuidbroek 
and existing adjacent districts, the city government of Apeldoorn sought 
to achieve maximum unity by linking its infrastructure to the existing road 
network leading out of the city. In the Masterplan Zuidbroek in 2003, the 
decision was taken to close an existing road (the Operettestreet) so that the 
older neighbourhoods would not be burdened excessively with outgoing 
traffic. Despite experts advising to go through various scenarios, the city 
choose the option that was the most beneficial to outgoing cyclists and that 
created only one exit out of the new neighbourhood. Estimates of the number 
of cars being in use in the future Zuidbroek were optimized.
As Zuidbroek started to be populated, more and more new inhabitants 
using their cars were feeling the downside of this decision. Popular protest 
arose among the new neighbours, the decision was contested and the city 
government decided to organize a creative meeting to consult the inhabitants 
on how the infrastructure should be redesigned. In the meeting, members of 
the city council actively participated, crafting their own solutions on the basis 
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of what they heard. The alternative that came out of the meeting catered 
to all interests existing at that time, but was evidently not futureproof. If 
Zuidbroek continued to grow, the solution would actually become an obstacle. 
Nonetheless, under popular pressure, the executive council adopted this 
measure and implemented it, despite city government experts’ criticism.
In a formal session of the city council, the council (being heavily lobbied by 
the newer inhabitants of Zuidbroek) reversed the executive councils decision. 
It adopted a resolution to open all of the previously existing roads for 
automobiles. In spite of heavy criticism from city government experts as well 
as public neighbourhood managers, the executive council chose to respect the 
council’s decision and implement it. As a matter of fact, the formal Masterplan 
was amended and toppled. Meanwhile, many of the formal objections had 
reached the state of court procedures. When finally these objections reached 
the highest court, all of Apeldoorn’s formal decisions were annulled, and 
Apeldoorn was charged by the courts to develop an entirely new decision.
7 Mechanisms: Description
7.1 Rules of the Game
City-citizens interactions in Apeldoorn appear to be strongly public 
oriented, formalized and structured towards municipal decision-making and 
cooperation between formal organizations. Apeldoorn uses five instruments 
to enhance citizen participation:
• the Future Agenda, developed once every four years by the citizens 
living a Neighbourhood in an interactive process conducted by the city 
Neighbourhood Manager, an urban civil servant hired and paid for by 
the city government;
• the biannual Neighbourhood Plan, officially defined as the outcome of 
the mediation between the demand of citizens (see Future Agenda) 
and the supply that the City of Apeldoorn and its official partners 
can publicly muster. This process is managed by the Neighbourhood 
executive councillor with support of the Neighbourhood Manager;
• an Action List, the compilation of actions flowing from the 
Neighbourhood Plan that serves as an instrument to enhance 
transparency of what the city government and its partners are doing; 
managed by Neighbourhood Manager;
• a financial incentive ordinance for civic initiatives “Premium on Action”, 
to support the development of small initiatives (< 1000 Euros) by 
ordinary citizens;
• the Neighbourhood Platform where city government, its institutional 
partners (CSOs) and other institutions coordinate their actions in the 
neighbourhood.
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The City of Apeldoorn acknowledges a limited number of organizations as 
its partners: two (fully publicly funded) social partners that carry out many 
of the city’s social programs; the social housing corporations; the police; and 
the formally acknowledged neighbourhood associations of citizens10. Other 
neighbourhood specific organisations, such as schools, churches, sports- and 
cultural organisations and associations of entrepreneurs can be invited to the 
Neighbourhood Platform.
The Neighbourhood Platform is managed by the Neighbourhood Manager. 
The style of the meetings is largely consultative; partners inform each other 
of their priorities and try to combine forces. New priorities are fed back to the 
Action list, the Neighbourhood Plan, the municipal safety plan and ultimately 
the Future Agenda.11 In addition to the neighbourhood platform, the city 
government organizes a network of neighbourhood safety prevention teams.
7.2 Participation
In all three cases initiative was sparked by individual citizens. The local 
government had its long-term planning and administration processes: 
designing a new urban infrastructure, allocating development plans among 
the various Apeldoorn villages for private developers to pick up and engage 
in dialogue with municipality, providing winter shelters through 100% 
subsidized professional social care foundation.
There was a clear tension between organized participation and direct 
participation. Individual initiatives ran counter to this distributive ratio: 
localized initiatives. More often than not, the initiatives were private: a 
church providing winter shelter for non-addict individuals and families that 
for personal reasons did not want to look for shelter in subsidized locations; 
an individual local builder developing a plan by acquiring real estate and 
redeveloping them; inhabitants protesting against the plans to connect a new 
development project by existing transit routes through their neighbourhood. 
Short term social micro politics conflicted with long term public macro 
politics. Neighbourhood committees were used by local politicians and public 
servants as sounding boards, but the lack of continuity (only 3–4 annual 
meetings) was insufficient to support the level of contact that was needed to 
build responsiveness and participation.
This led to a debate on the legitimacy of neighbourhood committees and 
the limited transparency of the way the municipality operates. The reliability 
and mandate of public neighbourhood frontliners was called into question. 
Informal and formal protests by inhabitants disturbed the local political process 
as well as policy implementation. Council members were shocked when they 
realized that the plans presented to them by the executive board had been 
10 Retrieved from http://www.apeldoorn.nl/DATA/TER/docs/politiek/dorps_wijkraden/
verordening_dorpsenwijkraden_2009_vs2.pdf
11 Retrieved from http://www.apeldoorn.nl/DATA/TER/docs/politiek/dorps_wijkraden/
stadsdeelaanpak%20kadernotitie.pdf
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part of a formal consultative process, but that there was no transparency for 
individual citizens (and subsequently criticism). Executive councillors brought 
plans to the municipal councils that they themselves were neutral too, or did 
not even support.
7.3 Deliberation
As to deliberation, the efforts to structurally connect local government 
with grass-roots initiatives seem fragment the deliberative process. More 
and more, substantive deliberation – the type we see in policy-initiatives 
being taken to the council – becomes disjointed from social politics. There, 
individual initiatives and complaints, stemming from micro politics, are 
directly channelled into the public deliberative process: either by civil servant 
neighbourhood frontliners, individual council members in their function as 
“people’s tribunes” or executive council members in their consultation hours 
and neighbourhood visits.
Formal deliberative processes are essentially top down in nature: they 
focus on the implementation of city council decisions, formulating action 
plans, cooperating with formal partners such as welfare foundations and 
housing cooperations. In essence, both councillors and civil servants try to 
be as facilitative as possible and accommodate citizens, in line with the local 
consultative culture, but the vertical logic of implementation is often at odds 
with the horizontal logic of grass roots development.
Long term planning and policy processes are predominantly the domain of 
the city council. Neighbourhood committees formulate their five year priority 
future agendas, and the council tries to connect them to the formulation of 
bylaws, spatial plans and city budgets. There are much less suited as a locus 
where horizontal and vertical logics meet, yet this is precisely what happens.
Disjointedness leads to tension on a number of points. Individual citizens and 
entrepreneurs signal a lack of responsiveness. This lack stems not from the 
inability of city hall to cooperate and communicate with society. The style 
of urban governance can essentially be characterized as consultative. It has 
much more to do with the differences in rhythm and scope of micro and 
macro politics. The more city hall tries to be facilitative, the more apparent 
the differences in function of facilitating and governing becomes.
In all of the three cases, precisely because of its consultative style, local 
government failed to adequately organize the balance and coherence 
between micro and macro politics. The frameworks formulated by the city 
council were too abstract to function as a basis for citizen and private initiatives. 
Subsequently, collaborative urban governance led to initiatives that only 
at the end of the process of policy formulation showed the imbalance and 
inadequacy of local formal policies. As the council had to base itself on the 
frameworks to call the executive into account, it often lacked an adequate 
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basis for evaluation and saw no other way than to follow the executive. Civil 
servants having to advise on either policies or concrete initiatives experienced 
little political guidance, little basis for independent expert advice and 
subsequently limited added value. Because of that, frontline public officials 
reported a gap between the logic of the situation that they operated in and the 
logic of the policies they had to carry out. Subsequently, CSOs, entrepreneurs’ 
and citizen initiatives were furthered and promoted without a proper critical 
evaluation of how these fitted into city policies. Without any political backing, 
public servants that operated in direct contact with citizens developed risk 
aversion. Procedures were slowed down or even halted, and policy advising 
was more often than not focused at building a dossier that would serve to 
stand up in court or under political scrutiny.
Because of this loss of sense and direction, citizens slowly lost clear view on 
what the city government wanted and how it operated. This could be called 
the paradox of collaborative decision-making: instead of increased trust and 
transparency, it can lead to estrangement of citizens from their government. 
The apparent loss of transparency and disjointedness of decision-making 
directly affects the legitimacy of the neighbourhood platforms. They become 
more and more formalized, attracting citizens that already know how to find 
their way through the maze of formal political decision-making. Losing their 
power as a platform for civic action as well as their function as a societal 
antenna, they too become part of the loss of transparency in the eyes of 
“individual” citizens.
7.4 Empowerment
To what extent is Apeldoorn’s engagement policy empowering? Institutions 
such as neighbourhood committees are financed by municipality, run by 
interested citizens, with an independent board chosen in direct meetings. 
Their function is to provide an organized regular “venue” for contacts between 
neighbourhood participants and formal organizations such as municipality 
and social housing cooperations. They have independent statutes and boards, 
but are based on a frame laid down in a local bylaw to allow the city to support 
its functioning. Neighbourhood associations of citizens can only participate 
as “official representatives” if they are acknowledged as such on the basis 
of the local bylaw on Village- and Neighbourhood Committees. To do that, 
they must fulfil a number of statutory procedural obligations as to openness, 
free elections and minimal number of meetings. The association’s board role 
ensures a cooperative sphere within the neighbourhood council and adequate 
staffing of the various voluntary neighbourhood committees.
In the three cases, the disjointedness of the process led to quite some 
stress for the neighbourhood committees. On the one hand, individual 
citizens were involved by concrete projects within their community, either as 
initiator, supporter or as opponent. They all dealt directly with the 
neighbourhood manager, who channelled their ideas, grievances and support 
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into the formal process. On the other hand, there were citizens not being 
involved and weary: the sudden installation of a winter shelter in their back 
yard; the development of a housing project on a scale and location hitherto 
not expected; or newcomers protesting against the (proposed) infrastructure 
of their new neighbourhood, wanting to change the status quo. Only in ‘De 
Maten’, the neighbourhood committee effectively succeeded in rallying 
the neighbourhood inhabitants under one flag, serving as a communicative 
platform for the church that started the shelter, the municipality and 
individual citizens. In ‘Loenen’, the community lamented the location, scope 
and appearance of the project, but did not want to obstruct a fellow villager 
and mainly focused on getting something built, at all. In ‘Zuidbroek’, the 
neighbourhood committee was not able to effectively channel the broad 
spectre of support, anger and anxiety into a social debate.
7.5 Control and Monitoring
Structuring the boundary can help to enhance transparency. The structured 
way of working with a four and two year agenda under joint executive-citizen 
control and the action lists in itself provide a sound basis for civic control and 
monitoring of action. In the three cases, however, these lists failed. They 
were all focused on the steady implementation and administration of city 
funds and manpower (formal politics), and said nothing about the sudden 
and spontaneous initiatives and passions that characterize social politics – the 
focus on the short term. Somehow, it is hard to combine the two worlds of 
politics, yet this is exactly the frontier that neighbourhood managers operate 
upon.
The actual effect of Apeldoorn’s city district approach on transparency depends 
on a number of factors. It relies on the quality and modus operandi of the 
neighbourhood managers, and their ability (as in a splits) to cater to the two 
very different rhythms and rules of the game. Because of the fragmentation 
of the two political processes (formal and social) and the haphazard feedback 
from individual initiatives into steady urban governance, the long term city 
development dashboards offered ever lesser guidance. Somehow, specifying 
the future in terms of substantial formal policy because of social politics led 
to policy “lock-in”: a situation where a social problem is framed in such a way 
that future options are no longer attainable.
In each of these cases we found such “lock-ins”. In ‘De Maten’, involving local 
communities in organizing and outsourcing winter shelters would have helped 
to have them more flexibly and timely involved. In ‘Loenen’, formulating a 
village housing policy rule that favoured redevelopment of commercial 
areas in combination with housing projects over pure housing projects 
created a deadlock on any development project, in turn necessitating direct 
involvement of city hall in an otherwise level playing field. In ‘Zuidbroek’, the 
future infrastructural grid was detailed to the nitty gritty to cater for the 
concerns of the current inhabitants of the neighbourhood.
178 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 13, No. 3–4/2015
Frans Jorna
8 Analysis
In the cases that we studied, government and society follow different 
logics. So much is evident from this discussion of three cases of government 
participating in society and citizens participating in formal democratic 
processes. In this article, we have focused on the relation between organized 
transparency and formal politics. The selection processes focused on extreme 
cases from different domains, showing different logics, and representing 
different ways of organizing citizen engagement. The logics and mechanisms 
we found are in no way representative of the entire “world” of participative 
processes.
‘Zuidbroek’ is the most spontaneous case, and mostly about public urban 
governance. Citizens and civil-society-organisations hardly play a role in the 
development of the infrastructural grid. ‘De Maten’ shows how in social 
urban governance CSOs of various categories, neighbourhood managers 
and committees interact. It also highlights the grass roots orientation of city 
councillors “cutting through red tape” to realize concrete results that make it 
to the headlines. In addition, the case shows the trade off between voluntary 
and professional service delivery. In ‘Loenen’, a private entrepreneur sought 
to realize a project that would be a contribution to the city’s policy. Here, the 
initiative was and remained private.
The participatory approach that Apeldoorn followed in these three cases can 
be described as collaborative, but the instruments used were geared towards 
involvement. This may be one of the explanations for the effects reported in 
this article.
8.1 Skewing Representation
As to the first hypothesis, the cases show little effects of participation on 
skewed representation. Although participation does appeal to the political 
gut feeling of councillors and provides them a platform for realizing concrete 
results, in formal politics the impact is limited. In the case of ‘Zuidbroek’, 
however, the newer (and more well to do, highly educated) inhabitants of 
Zuidbroek effectively captured one crucial council debate, toppling the 
Masterplan.
Formal, structured participation remains fundamentally open. One might 
question its relevance, the extent to which citizens objectives really have an 
impact on the way public expenditure is allotted and the size of the budget 
that they have a say on. There does seem to be a waning interest in formal 
participation, and informal actions such as those in Zuidbroek seem to be 
more effective in changing formal decision-making.
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8.2 Fair and Impartial Procedure
Impartiality is an issue in citizen engagement. Both the cases of Loenen and 
Zuidbroek shows how a strong collective of private interests can affect and 
change the transparency of formal procedures, and in ‘De Maten’ a small 
collective with the right contacts succeeded into securing a budget per 
client served that was much more favourable than the formally budgeted 
organization. As to fairness, there is certainly an issue of how criteria are 
interpreted and operationalized. In all of the three cases, formal criteria used 
by experts were easily reinterpreted or ‘bent’ so as to realize the public, social 
and private initiatives.
8.3 Objectivity and Expertise
Citizens nowadays can muster a level of expertise that the city’s apparatuses 
lack. The disjointed and fragmented character of the participatory processes 
studied nicely shows how public procedure can profit from the information 
and realization potential that urban societies have. Whether neighbourhood 
committees are the appropriate means to that end, is debatable. Somehow, 
in spite of the neighbourhood committees being actively involved, large parts 
of the solutions that citizens could have delivered where not mobilized. Even 
to the contrary: sometimes the presence and inaptitude of neighbourhood 
committees can lead to “countering strategies”: the organization of small 
groups that try to either tackle or capture the neighbourhood committees. 
The very public “formal politics” way in which they work is strongly at odds 
with the way in which inhabitants develop and coordinate their initiatives 
(social politics). The cost of all the procedures started in all three cases 
were enormous. For councillors this phenomenon is as attractive as a siren: 
impossible to ignore, dangerous to ride along with and very attractive to ride 
the waves. Populism and tendency to quickly “score” in the council.
Most of the cost here lies in the way public experts’ advice was being handled. 
Consultative decision-making and loose, disjointed coupling in each of the 
cases led to the negation of experts’ role in decision-making. The implication 
of this article is that the role of experts in participatory processes should be 
more closely investigated.
8.4 The Social Contract: Burdening Tomorrow
Participative decision-making, because of the disjointed character in these 
three cases, did lead to the externalisation of costs and risks: to homeless 
not serviced by the winter shelter in De Maten; to the inhabitants of Loenen 
who remained without new housing for a long period of years; and to the 
inhabitants of Zuidbroek (at first) and then Zevenhuizen.
Somehow, participation and solidarity are strongly at odds. This may be caused 
by the institutionalized way solidarity is organized (enforcing it by ordinances, 
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bylaws and legislation), as compared to the individualist tendencies that 
participation evokes. The tension between continuous administration and 
facilitating individual private initiatives is hard to handle for city government.
9 Conclusion and Implications
Participatory democracy combines two processes that are highly different. 
Engagement has long been defined as supportive for and embedded in 
democracy. As an institutional phenomenon, formal participatory processes 
tend to be oriented towards representation: embedding groups, in a 
pyramidal way, into a system that creates mandates.
Blurring state-society relations and increased public-private-social 
participation tends to erode formal local decision-making. Put bluntly: open 
(urban) governance erodes local government. Embedding transparency, as 
we have seen, has the effect of suppressing individual voices. In modern day 
governance, citizens do not allow for suppression of social politics. They play 
the formal functions and systems to get what they want, and, at the same 
time, when the system needs them, they may not be interested. All in all, 
embedded participation in urban governance has the tendency to pervert 
formal democracy. Fair and impartial procedure; reliance on expert advice; 
representation; organized solidarity – individualized urban governance does 
not respect them.
Furthermore, this analysis suggests that the highest stages of public 
participation – collaboration and empowerment – can only be achieved 
by targeted transparency. That is: mandating disclosure of standardized, 
comparable, and disaggregated information regarding specific products 
or practices to a broad audience in order to achieve a specific public policy 
purpose. In the public domain, this is often related to concepts like “open 
information” and “open data”. It not only pertains to the disclosure, but also to 
the form and format in which information is disclosed. To secure collaboration 
and empowerment, information should be disclosed in (open and transparent) 
forms, visualisations and formats that stimulate and empower citizens, local 
entrepreneurs and others to work with the data without having to go through 
the formal formation and socialization that public professionals go through 
traditionally. Although targeted transparency does not require specific 
technologies, it does often entail applying “civic and citizen tech” applications 
(Granier & Kudo, 2015).
Most cities are still a long way off from targeted transparency, and so is the 
academic world (Meijer, Curtin, & Hillebrandt, 2012; Meijer & Bolívar, 2015) in 
its ability to closely study open governance. Efforts to enhance transparency 
and open governance should be studied as complex processes of institutional 
change and include normative and political aspects of applying specific means 
(nowadays: ICT) to open up government. Such analyses should focus on all 
five aspects of local governance: rules of the game, participation, the quality 
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of deliberation, the distribution of power (empowerment) and control and 
monitoring effects. Studying open government efforts requires a much more 
critical normative approach than is often assumed – that is what these three 
case studies show us.
This assertion is not new. Most of the publications on the concept of open 
government have hinted at this. The contribution of this study lies in the 
shift towards the local level. This is where government and citizens interact, 
where (often) most public money gets spend, and where collaboration and 
empowerment may truly have effect. If the effort to increase the openness 
of government is to succeed at all, it should focus on the local level. As yet, 
in the Netherlands, open government has remained a central government 
theme (Jorna, 2015). Many of our participatory institutions on the local level 
are geared towards involvement. Collaborative and empowering democracy 
requires more collaborative platforms than neighbourhood committees.
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IZVLEČEK
1.02 Pregledni znanstveni članek
Odprtost in urbano upravljanje: Kako preglednost 
spodkopava lokalno oblast
Dandanes imajo lokalni politični voditelji težko delo. Vse bolj se namreč 
soočajo z občani, ki zahtevajo transparentnost in želijo imeti besedo pri 
ustvarjanju socialnih dobrin. Hegemonijo lokalne oblasti postavljajo pred izzive 
s povezovanjem svojih virov, s čimer želijo ustvariti sveže rešitve. Strah pred 
pravnimi spori, povečanje kompleksnosti oblikovanja politike in upravljanja 
ter pomanjkanje finančnih virov postavljajo lokalne uprave v položaj, ko si ne 
upajo tvegati.
Kako učinkovito strukturirati soočanje med lokalno oblastjo in lokalnimi 
skupnostmi? Pristopi odprtega in sodelovalnega upravljanja obetajo razvoj 
posredništva pri teh napetostih, toda kakšne so posledice za način delovanja 
lokalne demokracije, lokalne oblasti in lokalne uprave? Ta članek se na podlagi 
primerjalne študije primera iz Apeldoorna (Nizozemska) ozre na slabo stran 
zaupanja pri sodelovalnem in odprtem upravljanju. Članek identificira in 
analizira vzorce (pomanjkanja) odprtega upravljanja ter predlaga alternativne 
modele za organizacijo soočanja med lokalno oblastjo in družbo.
